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Abstract
Information-flow control (IFC) enforcing languages can provide high assurance that software does not leak infor-
mation or allow an attacker to influence critical systems. IFC hardware description languages have also been used to
design secure circuits that eliminate timing channels. However, there remains a gap between IFC hardware and soft-
ware; these two components are built independently with no abstraction for how to compose their security guarantees.
This paper presents a proposal for an instruction set architecture (ISA) that can provide the appropriate abstraction for
joining hardware and software IFC mechanisms. Our ISA describes a RISC-V processor that tracks information-flow
labels at run time and uses these labels to eliminate or mitigate timing channels. To make the ISA more practical, it
allows constrained downgrading of information; it permits trading off security for performance; and still offers control
primitives such as system calls. We prove timing-sensitive noninterference modulo downgrading and nonmalleability
for programs executing our ISA. This involves novel restrictions on the mutability of labels beyond previous dynamic
IFC systems. Furthermore, we define specific security conditions which correct hardware can implement to provide
software-level security and sketch how such hardware may be designed and verified.
1 Introduction
While timing channels have been well known to the security community for decades, recent hardware-based exploits
attest that these vulnerabilities remain unsolved problems. For example, the Spectre, Meltdown, and Foreshadow
attacks allow unprivileged processes to learn secrets by timing memory accesses [1–3]. The sophisticated security
mechanisms provided by these modern processors—privilege rings, memory management units, and software guard
extensions [4]—are completely undermined by uncontrolled timing behaviors. Current processors are not timing-safe.
The hardware-security community has investigated how to eliminate timing channels from circuit implementations,
but these are not panaceas. Hardware description languages (HDLs) such as SecVerilog [5] and Caisson [6] provide
timing-sensitive noninterference. They ensure that the time at which “public” state is updated does not depend on any
“secret” state. While they do provide useful primitives for implementing secure processors, these languages are not
sufficient for executing timing-safe software in a real-world setting. They can preclude necessary operations (such
as modifying security labels at run time) and limit software’s ability to specify security policies by baking those
policies into the hardware. In practice, software needs the ability to make application-level policy decisions while
still benefiting from the timing-sensitive guarantees of security-focused HDLs. On the other hand, more complex
instantiations of secure processors lack proofs that their ISAs enforce a meaningful security condition. The Hyperflow
processor [7], for instance, allows bounded software modification of the “context label”, but no ISA-level security
condition gives guidance on how safe this is.
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Software attempts to eliminate timing channels have had some success but ultimately are not comprehensive,
instead targeting empirically known sources of timing variation. For example, compilers for cryptographic compu-
tation [8–10] help to mitigate side channels but are fundamentally incomplete, since they only model well known
sources of timing variation such as branching and caching. To fully remove timing channels, a new interface is needed
to constrain how hardware state influences timing and which software instructions might leak information [11, 12].
The missing link between these hardware and software approaches is an Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) with
an explicit abstraction for the influence of the machine state on timing. With such an ISA, strong timing-sensitive
security conditions could be proved about software, relying on the guarantees made by hardware.
As a straw man, a software–hardware contract might ensure that all instructions with secret operands execute in
constant time. In fact, existing techniques for securely implementing cryptography implicitly assume such a contract.
However, constant time inevitably means worst-case time, in general, so such a contract has daunting implications
for the performance of memory operations. We argue that this kind of contract is unnecessarily restrictive. It is not
necessary that such instructions take constant time; it is only necessary that the time taken does not leak information.
This paper presents an ISA design that can be the interface connecting high-level timing-sensitive software ab-
stractions to low-level timing-safe processor implementations. Our ISA is based on information flow control (IFC),
which means our software–hardware contract is a set of IFC properties, rather than a prescriptive set of implementa-
tion behaviors such as forcing certain instructions to take constant time. Because the interface is based on IFC, it is
possible to formally prove that only permitted information affects timing.
Our ISA design includes features to avoid being overly restrictive, as IFC systems often are [13]. To this end, it
includes downgrading operations that allow software to endorse untrusted inputs and to declassify secret data. We
also allow software to specify its own timing security policy, which permits trading off timing-channel protection for
performance. Both of these features are limited so that they cannot be abused by attackers to undermine the security
guarantees of well-behaved programs. We additionally include security primitives that are required to implement
a practical operating system. These instructions are analogous to traditional system calls, but they are designed to
prevent unexpected information leakage.
The ISA in this paper tackles these goals with novel constructs and stronger formal security assurance:
• The ISA dynamically enforces timing-sensitive nonmalleable information flow [14], while also preventing im-
plicit flows created by checking mutable labels.
• The ISA allows software to control the level of timing-channel protection. The ISA can be used to eliminate
timing channels, mitigate timing channels with bounded information leak using predictive mitigation [11], or
enforce nonmalleable information flow control without timing channel protection.
• The ISA also includes novel instructions for implementing privilege changes to emulate the functionality of
system calls while maintaining nonmalleability.
• The ISA is accompanied by formal, proved security guarantees for programs implemented with it.
• We also formally specify security conditions with which hardware implementations must comply to ensure
security of the ISA.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents background on security labels and our attacker model. Section 3
sketches our approach to controlling timing channels. Sections 4 and 5 formalize the ISA and discuss its novel features
in detail. In Section 6, we discuss the security conditions assumed of the hardware and the practical challenges in
realizing those policies with modern HDLs. Section 7 presents the security results for this ISA and brief sketches of
their proofs. Section 8 uses example code to demonstrate use of the ISA. In Section 9 we discuss related work and we
discuss future work in Section 10.
2 Background
Our ISA both extends the RISC-V ISA1 [15] with new instructions and modifies the semantics of existing instructions.
RISC-V has instructions for computing on data, moving data to and from memory, and for changing program control
1Our approach is not specific to RISC-V and could be adapted for use in other instruction sets.
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Figure 1: Security lattice operators
flow. Architectural state refers to any storage location that is explicitly accessible or modifiable by software, including
the 32 general-purpose registers, the program counter and all memory locations. Our extension modifies all architec-
tural state to be associated with a security label. All other hardware state is considered microarchitectural and affects
only the performance of software but not its functional behavior.
The complete RISC-V ISA has many Control Status Registers (CSRs) which are considered architectural, but
for brevity we omit most of them from our formalization. These CSRs should in principle also each have their own
security labels.
2.1 Security Labels
As in most IFC systems, our security labels form a lattice that supports a “flows to” relation Ď, a lattice join \ and
a lattice meet [. We use the phrase “more restrictive” to refer to labels higher in the lattice ordering (e.g., a Ď b
means “b is at least as restrictive as a”). Figure 1 defines useful and mostly standard notation for label reference and
manipulation. The label lattice is a product of two other lattices, one for integrity (trustworthiness of data) and one for
confidentiality (secrecy of data), so a lattice element is a pair pi, cq. For generality, we represent the two component
lattices abstractly, but we restrict them to be dual lattices over the same carrier set. That is, the ordering Ď is reversed
for the integrity and confidentiality components of the label lattice. The reflection operator 

JJ , used for controlled
downgrading, swaps the two components of a lattice element.
An illustrative instantiation of this lattice is for the component lattice elements to represent principals. For instance,
component b could represent both Bob’s integrity (data written by Bob) and Bob’s confidentiality (data readable by
Bob), where Bob is a user of the system. Bob’s data can flow to anywhere that has a label at least as confidential and
no more trusted than b. Suppose there is a principal J that is least in the integrity ordering (meaning that it is trusted
by everyone) and greatest in the confidentiality ordering; conversely, K is highest in the integrity ordering (meaning
that it is untrusted) and least in confidentiality. Then data labeled pJ, bq flows to the label pb,Jq because in integrity
we have J Ď b and in confidentiality, b Ď J.
2.2 Downgrading
Downgrading is the act of lowering the label of data in the lattice, violating the normal direction of information flow
expressed by the lattice ordering. While downgrading greatly improves expressibility, it is important to constrain it, so
that an attacker cannot leverage the downgrading mechanism to extract more secrets or modify more trusted state than
the application developer intended. Our ISA enforces nonmalleability, a form of constrained downgrading, defined by
Cecchetti et al. [14]. Nonmalleability guarantees both robust declassification and its dual transparent endorsement,
which respectively constrain the downgrading of confidentiality and integrity.
We define compromised labels to represent exactly the set of labels that can never be safely downgraded under
nonmalleability.
Definition 1 (Compromised Labels). A label is compromised if it is not as trusted as it is secret:
l Ę 

JJ plq
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Figure 2: A 2-D slice of the combined confidentiality and integrity lattice. The red section represents all compromised
labels. The dotted lines represent valid boundaries specifying a particular attacker model and dividing the lattice into
quadrants. The intersection of these lines must be a compromised label, but need not be the same in each component
lattice.
Intuitively, compromised data contains secret information but has been modified by an attacker or other low-
integrity source. Allowing such data to be downgraded opens up the possibility of “confused deputy” style attacks,
where trusted code that executes downgrades can be tricked into downgrading arbitrary data.
2.3 Attackers
We represent attackers by the maximal integrity iA with which they can act and a minimal confidentiality cA that they
cannot observe. This is equivalent to typical attacker definitions which use a maximal confidentiality cM the attacker
can observe. Since we assume a finite lattice, we can translate cM to cA as follows:
Ls “ tl | l Ę cMu
cA ”
ł
lsPLs
ls
cA represents the disjunction of all labels which cM is not allowed to read, and therefore defines the minimal confi-
dentiality that they cannot observe.
It is convenient to summarize the attacker as a single label A “ piA, cAq. As depicted in Figure 2, the components
cA and iA define upward-closed sets of secret and untrusted labels:
S “ tl | cA Ď lu
U “ tl | iA Ď lu
The sets of public (P) and trusted (T ) labels are simply any labels not in S or U , respectively. Attackers can only read
public data and can only write to untrusted data.
Fair Attacks. Similar to prior work on robust declassification [16], our security guarantees hold against fair at-
tacks, where high-secrecy and high-integrity information are only protected from attackers that do not already know
those secrets or are not already highly trusted. In this work, fair attacks are defined as those where A represents a
compromised label:
Definition 2 (Fair Attacker). Attacker A “ piA, cAq is a fair attacker if and only if A is a compromised label.
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# s0: secret int, a0: public int[], a1: public int
add s1, a0, s0 # s1 = &(a0[s0])
lw s2, 0(s1) # s2 = *s1
lw a1, 0(a0) # a1 = a0[0]
Figure 3: Meltdown-style timing channel via microarchitectural state
Since a given attacker may be partly trusted with respect to integrity and confidentiality, the label A is not a fixed,
known label. Rather, we consider the system to be secure if it is secure against all possible fair attackers A.
Our earlier Bob example can illustrate why this definition eliminates unfair attackers. In a security lattice including
the orderings pJ,Kq Ď pb, bq Ď pK,Jq, consider the attacker with Bob’s integrity who is only allowed to read fully
public data: A “ pb, bq.2 A is not a fair attacker: it is as trusted as Bob (and can therefore impersonate him) but is not
supposed to learn any of Bob’s secrets. Essentially, this A would model Bob attacking himself. Our security condition
does not prevent Bob from mistakenly releasing his own data to the public; it prevents untrusted attackers from doing
so and from manipulating Bob into doing so for them.
Other Assumptions. We assume a strong attacker that may observe the wall-clock time at which writes to public
locations occur, and not just the ordering of writes. This observational power corresponds to a colocated attacker-
controlled process that can race on memory accesses and has access to wall-clock time. Defending against such a
strong attacker is preferable since it makes the security assurance correspondingly stronger.
Since our ISA implements a dynamic IFC system, attackers can observe the labels of data through the success or
failure of run-time checks [17]. For example, if secret (S) is used (either directly or implicitly through branching ) to
label another piece of data (D) as secret, then an attacker may learn information about S when their attempt to read
D fails. The ISA does not include instructions for explicitly reading labels and therefore we assume attackers cannot
directly read label values.
3 Controlling Timing Channels
Here we present high-level examples of where timing channels arise and how we approach mitigating them. Figure 3
contains RISC-V code with a simple microarchitectural timing channel: a secret-dependent load causing cache inter-
ference. In this example, s0 is a secret value; a0 and a1 are public information. In modern processors, lw (“load
word”) is not a constant-time operation; its duration depends primarily on the address being accessed and other mi-
croarchitectural state (notably the cache). In this case, the address depends on s0, a secret offset into array a0. Loading
the data at address s1 also causes some region of the a0 array to be placed in cache. If this region happens to be close
to the beginning of the array, the second lw experiences a cache hit and executes quickly. In this way, an attacker who
can observe how long it takes to load public information learns some secret information. This vulnerability reflects
the core information transfer mechanism of the Meltdown attack [2].
In our ISA, software specifies a timing label, an upper bound on what information may influence instruction
completion timing. If the program in Figure 3 executed with a secret timing label, then it would have the same un-
satisfactory timing guarantees as current software. However, if the timing label were set to public, then only public
information could influence how long any instruction took and the latency of the second lw will not reveal any infor-
mation about s0. Obviously, software running at a low timing label may not benefit from all possible performance
optimizations, but it does not necessarily require hardware to take worst-case time.
Figure 4 represents a different kind of timing channel, where an attacker can determine information about secrets
by observing how long secret-dependent operations take. In this example, the attacker primes the cache by loading a
public value, l1. Then, by observing when l0 is updated, they can infer whether or not the memory read operation in
between was a cache hit or miss. A hit implies that the true branch was taken, since l1 was already cached.
2Note that this label is not compromised since pb, bq Ď pb, bq
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# l0,l1,l2: public int
# h1,h2: secret-trusted int
# secret: secret-trusted boolean
l0 = l1
if (secret): h1 = l1; else: h1 = l2;
l0 = 1
Figure 4: Untrusted inputs causing secrets to leak via timing
Table 1: Modified Semantics for Standard RISC-V Instructions
Insn Type Restrictions Behavior
COMPUTE pcl \ Lprs1q \ Lprs2q Ď Lprdq M 1 “M rrd ÞÑ Rs1 bRs2s
LOAD pcl \ Lprs1q \ LpMpRs1qq Ď Lprdq M 1 “M rrd ÞÑMpRs1qs
STORE pcl \ Lprs1q \ Lprdq Ď LpMpRs1qq M 1 “M rMpRs1q ÞÑ Rds
BRANCH Lprs1q \ Lprs2q Ď pcl pc1 “ pRs1 bRs2q?imm : pc` 4
JUMP Lprs1q Ď pcl pc1 “ Rs1
ALL PC LpMppcvqq Ď pcl ^ pcl Ď 

JJ ppclq applies to all instructions
ALL T tl Ď 

JJ ptlq ^ pcl Ď tl applies to all instructions
The problem here is related to the interaction of low-integrity state with high-confidentiality computation; a cache
that has been tainted with attacker-influenced state should not be allowed to influence the duration of secret operations.
We incorporate this idea into our upcall instruction, which allows software to execute in a secret context for a
predetermined amount of time. Critically, low-integrity attackers cannot upcall their way into learning secrets nor
can they influence how trusted code execute their upcalls. By considering the relationship between integrity and
confidentiality, we can allow programs similar to Figure 4 to execute safely, while disallowing variants that might leak
information through timing.
4 Formalizing The ISA
4.1 Definitions and Model
In this section we present an abridged semantics for our ISA. First, we introduce the model for our semantics and some
notational definitions. We represent our ISA as a small-step operational semantics on configurations.
Definition 3 (Configurations). A processor configuration represents the current state of the processor, encompassing
both architecturally visible state and microarchitectural state.
SW registers/memory M : Int Ñ Int
SW label mappings L : Int Ñ Lbl
opaque HW state µ : Name Ñ Lbl
program counter and label pc : PC “ Intˆ Lbl
cycle counter and label t : T “ Intˆ Lbl
call stack CS : List(PCˆT)
processor configuration C : xCS ,M,L, µ, pc, ty
For simplicity, we represent both registers and DRAM as a single mapping M , in which registers are located at
special addresses. Addresses are drawn from Int, a set of finite-size integers.3 Name is a set of variable names, which
3The size of this range (for example, 32 or 64 bits) is architecture-specific.
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GR $ xCS ,M,L, µ, pc, ty ÝÑ xCS 1,M 1, L1, µ1, pc1, t1y
EXECUTE
GR $ xCS ,M,L, pc, ty ÝÑA xCS 1,M 1, L1, pc1, t1ly GR $ xCS ,M,L, µ, pc, ty ÝÑµ xµ1, t1vy
GR $ xCS ,M,L, µ, pc, ty ÝÑ xCS 1,M 1, L1, µ1, pc1, t1y
STALL
xCS ,M,L, µ, pc, ty ÝÑµ xµ1, t1vy
GR $ xCS ,M,L, µ, pc, ty ÝÑ xCS ,M,L, µ1, pc, pt1v, tlqy
Figure 5: Complete CPU operational semantics. These rules defer to semantics which describe how architectural state
is modified (ÝÑA) and which describe how microarchitectural state is modified (ÝÑµ).
can refer to locations but are not directly representable as values. Lbl is the set of labels representable in our lattice.
For clarity, we abbreviate full configurations as Ci, where subscript i on elements disambiguates between source
configurations (e.g., M1 is the software memory of configuration C1). Additionally, we use pcv to refer to the value
of the pc and pcl to refer to its label. The same convention is used for t.
In order to reason about the security label of a given piece of state in the processor, we define various conventions
for looking up label values and converting integers to labels.
Definition 4 (Label lookup). Both architectural state and microarchitectural state are tagged with security labels.
These functions describe how to determine the value of a location’s label, where i P Int, and n P Name.
Interpret i as a Lbl value γpiq
Label of location i Lpiq
Label of n ΓpCqpnq
Γ is a function parameterized on processor state. This function is defined statically for a given implementation of
the hardware at design time. This parameterization allows the label of any location to depend on software-specified
values and/or other run-time microarchitectural state.
4.2 Operational Semantics
We present this ISA as a small-step operational semantics, factored into two semantics: a partial semantics specified
by software instructions and an opaque hardware semantics that describes the behavior of microarchitectural state.
Figure 5 shows the complete operational semantics for a CPU and how, in any given time step, the CPU can up-
date architectural state (by taking a ÝÑA transition) or “stall” (from the perspective of software) by updating only
microarchitectural state. While we provide the explicit semantics for ÝÑA (see Figure 7), the semantics for ÝÑµ
are intentionally left unspecified because they are implementation-dependent. The architectural semantics (ÝÑA) do
not depend upon the current state of µ since µ should not, by definition, influence the behavior of software (beyond
timing). Instead, we define a set of properties that the transition function ÝÑµ must satisfy. It is these properties that
allows the ISA to offer security guarantees that current architectures lack.
Table 1 provides an abridged definition of instruction restrictions (also referred to as “label checks”) and behavior
for pre-existing RISC-V instructions. For abbreviation purposes, the notation rx represents the index of a register
specified by an instruction. To refer to the contents of the register, we write Rx, a shorthand for Mprxq, the contents
of the special memory location which holds that register. The symbol b represents some arithmetic or relational
operator appropriate to the instruction in question.
In general, the restrictions on instructions prevent state with high-security labels from influencing state with low
security labels. If the restrictions for a given rule cannot be met, the instruction becomes a “no-op” that increments
pcv but has no other effects. No-ops avoid leaking information through the enforcement of label checks. However,
for certain errors, it is safe to jump to a special program counter, errorpc, while retaining the current pcl and tl. One
such error is violation of the ALL PC rule, which can safely cause the program to jump to errorpc without breaking
noninterference. The full list of these errors is specified in the technical report [18]. At this point, any error-handling
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if (s):
upgrade(ts, UNTRUSTED)
else:
skip
ts2 := ts
Figure 6: Leaking secrets via an integrity upgrade. Execution is successful exactly when s is false.
program may execute (for example, to signal termination), as long as it obeys the restrictions on normal execution. To
a public observer, a program that produces an error with a secret pc label therefore appears equivalent to a correctly
operating program.
Appendix A lists specific rules for which label-checking operations can raise explicit errors and which require
squashing via no-op. We include in our proof that error handling does not violate our security conditions.
The COMPUTE, LOAD/STORE and BRANCH restrictions are straightforward; they ensure that instruction operands
and the pc must flow to the destination register. The BRANCH restrictions prevent implicit flows.
The ALL PC restriction ensures that the instruction being executed is at least as trusted and public as the pc itself.
This constraint prevents a trusted or public program from reading instructions from secret or untrusted memory. Ad-
ditionally, ALL PC maintains the invariant that a program may execute only if it has an uncompromised pc. We note
in Section 5 that keeping the pc uncompromised is required to prevent call gates from breaking nonmalleability.
The ALL T restriction ensures that the timing label is uncompromised and is at least as restrictive as the pc label.
We summarize these restrictions as a validity condition:
ISVALIDppcl, tlq fi ppcl Ď tlq ^ ppcl Ď 

JJ ppclqq ^ ptl Ď 

JJ ptlqq
Intuitively, it would be difficult to implement any reasonable hardware that did not guarantee this condition. In any
case where the pc label was more restrictive, the duration of the instruction would have to be independent of the
instruction performed! This is obviously impractical for real systems, and the restriction allows us to mostly reason
about pcl when proving security conditions (see Appendix B).
4.3 Label Mutation
Figure 7 gives the operational semantics for instructions that modify label state or that raise or lower privilege.4
Label-mutation instructions modify the labels of memory locations. It is well known that flow-sensitive monitors,
including this ISA5, can leak information by modifying labels if mutation is not appropriately limited [17, 19]. Since
our approach involves no extra static information about the executing software, we implement the no-sensitive-upgrade
(NSU) policy [20]. The NSU policy dynamically prevents leaks by requiring that the pcl can flow to both the original
label and the final label of the data.
However, this restriction does not eliminate all information leakage caused by label mutation. Consider the ex-
ample in Figure 6. In this case, the label change is inside a secret context, which requires that the pc is secret and
trusted. Register ts is secret and trusted and the upgrade makes it secret and untrusted. The label pcl flows to both
the original and final labels of ts, so the aforementioned rule is satisfied. Nevertheless, the final assignment (which
occurs in a public context) to ts2 will succeed in the case where s is false and fail otherwise since ts now represents
untrustworthy information.
Additionally, since label arguments themselves are labeled memory locations, we require that the label of those
arguments flows to pcl. For example, the instruction dwnlbl x3, x6 means: “Downgrade the label of register x3 to
the label represented by the value stored in register x6”. If the label of x6 itself were secret, using it to change the
label of x3 in a public context could allow an observer to learn about the content of x6. If the label of a location whose
content is used as a label does not flow to pcl, then the instruction becomes a no-op to prevent this kind of leakage.
4The Rsn notation refers to RISC-V style register addresses; instruction-size limitations require that the real encoding differ slightly from this
notation, but it is semantically equivalent.
5Although this ISA is flow-sensitive, it does not have floating labels [19], and therefore labels must be explicitly changed by software instructions.
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GR $ xCS ,M,L, pc, ty ÝÑA xCS ,M 1, L1, pc1, tly
l “ Lprdq l1 “ γpRs1q RELBLppcl, l, l1q Lprs1q Ď pcl L1 “ Lrrd ÞÑ l1s
GR $ xCS ,M,L, pc, ty ÝÑA xCS ,M,L1, ppcv ` 4, pclq, tly
DWNLBL
l “ Lprdq l1 “ γpRs1q UPLBLppcl, l, l1q Lprs1q Ď pcl L1 “ Lrrd ÞÑ l1s
GR $ xCS ,M,L, pc, ty ÝÑA xCS ,M,L1, ppcv ` 4, pclq, tly
UPLBL
 INUPCALL pc1l “ γpRs1q
t1l “ γpRs2q ISVALIDppc1l, t1lq Lprs1q \ Lprs2q \ Lprs3q \ Lprdq Ď pcl pcl \ tl Ď pc1l Ď t1l
endpc “ Rs3 endt “ Rd ` tv CS 1rheads “ ppendpc, pclq, pendt , tlqq CS 1rtails “ CS
GR $ xCS ,M,L, pc, ty ÝÑA xCS 1,M,L, ppcv ` 4, pc1lq, t1ly
UPCALL
INUPCALL ppendpc, pc1lq, pendt , t1lqq “ CS rheads tv ‰ endt
GR $ xCS ,M,L, pc, ty ÝÑA xCS ,M,L, pc, tly UPRET-NOP
INUPCALL ppendpc, pc1lq, pendt , t1lqq “ CS rheads CS 1 “ CS rtails tv “ endt
GR $ xCS ,M,L, pc, ty ÝÑA xCS 1,M,L, pendpc, pc1lq, t1ly
UPRET-DONE
H “ CS rheads endpc “ pcv ` 4 CS 1rheads “ ppendpc, pclq, pnull, tlqq
CS 1rtails “ CS ppc1, t1lq “ GRpRs1q ISVALIDppc1l, t1lq Lprs1q Ď pcl pc1l \ t1l Ă pcl
GR $ xCS ,M,L, pc, ty ÝÑA xCS 1,M,L, pc1, t1ly
DWNCALL
pppc1v, pc1lq, pnull, t1lqq “ CS rheads pcl \ tl Ă pc1l [ t1l CS 1 “ CS rtails
GR $ xCS ,M,L, pc, ty ÝÑA xCS 1,M,L, ppc1v, pc1lq, t1ly
DWNRET
pc1l “ γpRs1q
t1l “ γpRs2q pcl Ď pc1l tl Ď t1l ISVALIDppc1l, t1lq Lprs1q \ Lprs2q Ď pcl H ‰ CS rheads
GR $ xCS ,M,L, pc, ty ÝÑA xCS ,M,L, ppcv ` 4, pc1lq, t1ly
RAISELBL
 INUPCALL
GR $ xCS ,M,L, pc, ty ÝÑA xCS ,M,L, ppcv ` 4, pclq, tly
OTHER ERROR
INUPCALL
GR $ xCS ,M,L, pc, ty ÝÑA xCS ,M,L, pc, tly UPRET ERROR
Figure 7: Operational semantics for downgrading and label-mutating instructions given a call-gate registry GR.
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public_val = 0
while (secret_1 < secret_2):
# do some slow computation
secret_1++
public_val = 1
Figure 8: Secrets may be learned from the timing of the write to public_val.
We introduce additional restrictions on both upgrade and downgrade rules to prevent similar kinds of information
leakage; these rules differ from each other in order to be more permissive.
Upgrading. The predicate UPLBLppcl, l, l1q expresses the NSU check for upgrading label l to label l1 in the context
pcl:
UPLBLppcl, l, l1q fi ppcl Ď l Ď l1q ^ pl1 Ď 

JJ ppclqq
The intuition here is that we need an upper bound for the final label to prevent it from moving to a new quadrant
in the lattice. UPLBL deviates from the original NSU definition by adding the constraint l1 Ď 

JJ ppclq. This prevents
programs from creating untrustworthy information in secret contexts and vice versa. For the program in Figure 6, the
uplbl instruction fails the UPLBL test, preventing the offending label modification. Unfortunately, this still leaks the
value of s since the program only fails when s is true. The key insight for handling this case is that the failure happens
while the pc is still in a high context, so measures can be taken to prevent a low context from observing the failure.
We discuss this leakage in further detail below (Section 4.4).
Downgrading. There are two different cases to consider when downgrading label l to l1: l1 Ď l and l1 Ę l. For the
first case, the predicate DWNLBLppcl, l, l1q expresses the existing nonmalleable information flow restrictions when
downgrading label l to label l1 in the context pcl.
DWNLBLppcl, l, l1q fi ppcl Ď l1q ^ pl1 Ď lq ^ pl Ď 

JJ plqq
The other case is the general form of downgrading, which we model as first executing a downgrade from l to l [ l1,
followed by an upgrade to l1. As one might expect, this essentially combines the restrictions from those other cases:
RELBLppcl, l, l1q fi ppcl Ď l [ l1q ^ pl Ď 

JJ plqq ^ pl1 Ď 

JJ ppclqq
This check implies the original nonmalleability restrictions,6 which means it is no more permissive. An alternative
for modeling general downgrades would be to simulate first an upgrade to the join and then a downgrade. That
requirement implies the one we’ve just described and is therefore also safe. However, it may be overly restrictive. It
is unclear if the two are equally permissive or if downgrade-then-upgrade permits more safe programs for our lattice
definition. This question lies outside the scope of this paper.
4.4 Raising context labels
The upcall/upret instruction pair introduces primitives for controlling timing channels while branching on secret or
untrusted values. The upcall instruction allows a process to enter a more restricted context with a higher pcl and tl,
while pushing the current pcl and tl to a call stack. In the new context, the program cannot write to low outputs, but
its execution timing can be influenced by high hardware state. However, returning from this context reveals timing
information about the duration of the subprogram. This problem can be seen in the higher-level program shown in
Figure 8. The low adversary is allowed to observe the time of completion for the while block, since it can observe the
timing of the writes to public_val. However, the duration of this block depends upon secret values. This example
shows a more general version of the label-checking termination channel from Figure 6.
6In our setting, their requirement would roughly translate to the conditions: l Ď l1 \ 

JJ ppcl \ lq and pcl Ď l1.
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To control timing channels, upcall instructions are given an absolute end time and an ending program counter
as arguments. Once the end time is reached, the processor steps to the end pcv . The instruction arguments are saved
onto a hardware call stack along with the caller’s pcl and tl. Intuitively, this semantics preserves noninterference
because the subprogram cannot modify memory locations or labels in a way that changes low observations. Since
the completion of the upcall is determined purely from information of at most the level pcl, no termination channel
influences subsequent program steps.
In general, this simple approach will be difficult to use in practice because it requires programmers or compilers
to know impractically cycle-accurate durations of program segments. However, it does have a use case for running
untrusted functions. The upcall instruction can be used to create a low-integrity sandbox that executes until the
provided timeout expires.
Using upcalls for timing mitigation. To support a more flexible programming model, we also expose a generic
interface for handling returns from high contexts via an exception. When the timer completes, if the current instruction
is not an upret, the configuration steps to a known exception handler pcv
7. Furthermore, when a label check fails
inside of an upcall, the program simply stalls (i.e., steps to a new configuration where no architectural state has
changed). Whichever of these conditions causes the exception is recorded in a status register (implemented as a CSR),
with the high label of the upcall. In Figure 7, we use the INUPCALL check to specify whether or not a configuration
is inside of an upcall by inspecting the head of the call stack. If INUPCALL is true, then the error can be handled
normally, otherwise it should be squashed and the program should stall.
INUPCALL fi
pppendpc, pc1lq, pendt , t1lqq “ CS rheadsq
^ ppc1l Ď pcl ^ t1l Ď tlq
With this primitive, the timing mitigation algorithms described in prior work [11,21] can be implemented, enforc-
ing bounded leakage on information from the high context. We note that this information release is still nonmalleable;
both robust declassification and transparent endorsement are maintained under these mitigation mechanisms. Impor-
tantly, our restrictions prevent attackers from exploiting mitigation to exfiltrate arbitrary data.
Checking whether or not a high context subprogram failed due to violating the label check restrictions also rep-
resents a nonmalleable information release. The data in the status register can be declassified or endorsed to reveal
whether or not a label check caused the subprogram to fail. Revealing this information violates the termination sen-
sitivity of the subprogram noninterference. Although the subprogram cannot modify any low state, information is
transferred via termination.
Further upcall restrictions. upcall and dwncall instructions may not be executed inside an upcall. Intuitively,
a dwncall (which lowers pcl) would allow a process to produce public outputs while still inside the upcall, leaking
information about its timing and progress. As mentioned, the arguments to the upcall instruction must also themselves
be labeled so that they flow to the current pcl. Without this requirement, secret or untrusted information could still
influence the duration of the subprogram.
The nesting restriction could be relaxed to allow for multiple upcall instructions so that the context could be
raised repeatedly. However, we do not include it in this formalism since it would complicate the requirements for
hardware (call stacks would no longer have finite depth). In reality, nesting would be useful for implementing the
process of control transfer from user space to operating system privileges and from there to the hypervisor level.
Permanently raising context labels. In addition to the upcall instruction, the pcl and tl can be raised by simply
writing to them (they are implemented as CSRs). In order to preserve noninterference, the labels can only be raised
in this way. Once raised, a program can only lower its context labels by executing a dwncall instruction. This limits
the possible leakages caused by the program to outputs produced by the set of trusted functions which it is allowed to
call. We discuss this further in the next section.
7Termination behavior can be configured on a per-program basis; it is only required that the configuration is completed using only information
that is low relative to the program’s original pcl.
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4.5 Lowering context labels
The dwncall/dwnret instructions allow programs to call into more-public and more-trusted contexts via call gates.
Call gates are essentially labeled functions that have been pre-registered by a public–trusted entity. The call-gate
registry is effectively a read-only function lookup table.8 A call gate registration contains a pc and tl; using a dwncall
instruction sets the current pc and tl to the gate’s values while pushing the prior values onto a call stack. These
instructions provide hardware support for the privilege escalation features described in prior work on security and
information flow. In particular, they closely resemble the primitives required to implement gates from the Multics and
HiStar operating systems [22, 23]. In those systems, gates were used respectively to call known functions with higher
privileges than the caller, and to implement synchronous RPC.
4.6 Exceptions and Asynchrony
We do not include exception configuration or handling in our ISA formalism or formal security proof. In this section,
we describe how one could incorporate these features into our ISA without compromising its security conditions. All
exceptions have a triggering condition and an exception program counter (epc) that points to the interrupt service
routine (ISR)9.
Trigger conditions can be specific to an ISA-extension or architecture and are often defined by the hardware. The
epc is programmed by software and stored in a CSR. There are additional exception-masking CSRs which software
can use to suppress the trigger conditions. In general, in order for an exception to fire, the security label of all trigger
conditions (including masks) must flow to the current pcl; otherwise, an attacker process may learn that an exception
fired and deduce some secret related to its cause. For arithmetic exceptions such as integer overflow or divide-by-zero,
this implies that the instruction operands flow to the current pcl; if they don’t, the exception must be suppressed. The
label of the pc while the ISR is actually handling the exception must also be lower bounded by all trigger inputs and
the label of the epc register itself. In this way, if an exception trigger condition is secret, its handler must be executing
in a secret context and cannot produce public outputs.
We believe the primary complications involved in integrating exception handling into such an ISA are as follows.
First, it is not always clear how to label exception triggers. For example, should an incoming network packet signal be
labeled public or could the timing of packet arrival give an attacker information about co-resident processes? Likely,
this choice should be programmable by software depending on the threat model. Secondly, depending upon how
hardware state is labeled, asynchronous exceptions (such as timers and incoming network packets) may be frequently
dropped or delayed. In order to account for this, the processor and ISA may need to be modified to support batched
handling of exceptions along predetermined schedules within the CPU itself. Additionally, it may be difficult to limit
the number of actual hardware signals that contribute to exception trigger conditions in real implementations. For
example, Van Bulck et al. [24] found that Intel SGX implementations allowed the currently executing instruction to
complete before handling certain exceptions. Waiting for instruction completion means that most control signals in
the CPU would influence the exception trigger conditions. It is not always possible to immediately transfer control
to the ISR without waiting for some state to clear in the CPU, and thus it may be challenging to implement practical
exceptions that execute in contexts that have low confidentiality or high integrity.
5 ISA Design Discussion
Here we highlight some salient points of our design and compare and contrast with other language-based IFC systems.
Compromised contexts and data undermine nonmalleability The original nonmalleability paper [14] identified
restrictions on downgrading that are equivalent to our observation that compromised labels cannot be downgraded to
public or trusted status. We additionally notice that executing in a compromised context can unsafely leak information
through timing. Specifically, this can violate the non-occlusion principle of declassification described by Sabelfeld and
Sands [25]. Consider the scenario where upcall operations implement predictive mitigation, and therefore enforce
8Using rules similar to the uplbl instruction, call gate entries can also be made more secret or less trusted without violating noninterference.
9 This is not the same as the RISC-V epc CSR, we are paraphrasing the exception handling mechanism for clarity.
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nonmalleability (rather than noninterference). Allowing a process to raise its pcl and/or tl to a compromised level
is unsound because it implicitly allows that process to declassify arbitrary data. With our restrictions, observing the
duration of this subprogram leaks only the caller’s secrets and is therefore robust; otherwise any information could be
implicitly declassified via this channel.
Software can control how much information it leaks through timing channels Our ISA provides strong guar-
antees with respect to timing. As long as a program keeps its timing label low and executes fully low-deterministic
upcalls, it leaks no information through its timing behavior. However, programs are not strictly bound by these restric-
tions. By explicitly exposing the pcl, tl and upcall timing to software, we grant programs the ability to weaken these
restrictions gracefully to suit their needs. This provides important flexibility for situations where our threat model is
overly strong or when application-specific data may only require probabilistic guarantees about timing consistency.
Limitations of Our ISA While our ISA has strong security guarantees and important security primitives, there is
much room for future research. First of all, our timing label mechanism does provide a bound on which information
may be implicitly leaked through timing channels. However, this coarse-grained approach could potentially leak
any information below the timing label. This behavior is unlike the dwnlbl instruction, which explicitly denotes the
memory location to be downgraded. Our ISA also does not incorporate explicit timing into any instructions other than
upcall. While this lack of explicitness is beneficial for remaining implementation-agnostic, it does not give guidance
on how to implement secure and efficient hardware. Yu et al. [26] describe an ISA which focuses on this performance
aspect, by exposing more microarchitectural information in their ISA. Future secure ISAs and ISA extensions must
be designed with both of these goals in mind, potentially leading to new semantics or completely novel timing-aware
instructions.
Finally, our work only targets the single core subset of the RISC-V ISA and does not provide guidance on how to
address multicore communication and interference. This realm of interconnected computing devices communicating
via shared memory and coherence networks introduces many more opportunities for timing interference and side
channel communication. Investigating this problem requires a significant further effort in analyzing the semantics of
existing memory models, microarchitectural coherency guarantees and how to efficiently incorporate IFC labels into
these protocols.
6 Hardware Semantics and Properties
As mentioned earlier, an actual hardware implementation of this ISA will be a circuit that not only implements the
software-visible semantics but also refines the full CPU semantics. We now discuss properties of a hardware imple-
mentation that are sufficient to guarantee the ISA-level security conditions. Additionally, we discuss the implications
of these properties on hardware implementations and comment on what techniques may be utilized to verifiably con-
struct hardware with said properties.
Property 1 (Deterministic Execution). For any configuration C, and for all i P t1, 2u
C ÝÑµ xµi, tviy ùñ ppµ1 “ µ2q ^ ptv1 “ tv2qq
^
C ÝÑ Ci ùñ C1 “ C2
The operational semantics for the transition function on microarchitectural states must be deterministic. Further-
more, we assume that the full semantics which determines when to stall the processor is also deterministic.
We believe that this property can also be relaxed to allow for sources of nondeterminism (such as changes in
clock frequencies, random number generators, etc.) as long as this nondeterminism is truly generated by noise or other
public/trusted factors. Defining exactly what factors are public/trusted is a complex decision related to particular threat
models and is out of scope for this paper.
13
Property 2 (Single-Step Machine Noninterference). Given a set of low labels in the security lattice, L,
@C, i P t1, 2u.
pC1 “L C2q ^ pCi ÝÑ C 1iq
ùñ ppµ11 “L µ12q ^ pt1v1 “L t1v2qq.
The hardware implementation must enforce a timing-sensitive noninterference condition for microarchitectural
state for all transitions. With this definition, the label of t effectively bounds which hardware state may affect the
timing of operations (including the decision to stall or not stall computation). The above property also implies that
ÝÑµ enforces timing-sensitive noninterference on µ and t. Note that this noninterference condition only applies
for microarchitectural state, not architectural state. The architectural state may be downgraded using the downgrade
instructions in our ISA.
The above definition of timing-sensitive machine noninterference is actually overly strong and we can substitute
a slightly weaker property. t is interpreted as a global clock; however, this requirement enforces that hardware end
instructions at exactly the same real time whenever t1l P L. For most cases this isn’t a problem, since tl P L and
therefore both configurations start executing the instruction at the same time. It is not unreasonable for hardware to
therefore ensure that they end at the same time by using only low-labeled state to influence their duration.
However, some instructions can lower tl thereby creating a scenario where tl P H and t1l P L. In our ISA, dwncall
can create this scenario and would theoretically require that two executions always enter the call gate at the same time,
even when they previously had high timing labels. Since tv1 ‰ tv2 there is no way for a CPU to ensure t1v1 “ t1v2.
Luckily, real time equivalence is not really the guarantee we need. We just need the duration of the instructions to be
equal in both configurations, if t1 P L. For all of the instructions in our ISA, this results in exactly the same security
guarantees that we have claimed in Section 7. Below is the amended Single-Step Machine Noninterference property:
@C, i P t1, 2u.
pC1 “L C2q ^ pCi ÝÑ C 1iq
ùñ ppµ11 “L µ12q ^ pt1l P L ùñ t1v1 ´ tv1 “ t1v2 ´ tv2qqq.
Property 3 (Computability of Label Lookups).
DΓ, @C, n P dompµq,ΓpCqpnq is computable
Property 3 has so far been an implicit assumption. The function Γ is parameterized on all of the configuration state;
it represents a function that must be computed at run time and therefore must be implemented in the microarchitecture.
In combination with Property 2, this implies that the process of looking up microarchitectural labels does not violate
noninterference [27]. It also implies that, after a configuration step C ÝÑ C 1, Γ determines low equivalence by
evaluating labels of µ using C 1, not C (we formalize low equivalence further in Section 7).
Intuitively, the above properties suggest that there is no hardware-level information flow which violates timing-
sensitive noninterference except for flows that are explicitly induced by software instructions. For instance, declas-
sifying a secret memory location, loc, with a dwnlbl instruction can only declassify microarchitectural state that
specifically represents loc’s data. Section 7 discusses the ISA-level security properties that we can obtain, given these
hardware properties, in more detail.
6.1 Implications for Hardware Implementations
Property 1 can be easily satisfied, for the most part, as processors are typically implemented as deterministic digital
circuits. While some features require a notion of nondeterminism (such as random number generators or external
sensor inputs), these can be modeled as the I/O to a deterministic digital circuit. In the design, one must label and
build deterministic circuitry used to process these values (e.g., a buffer containing input packets from the network) but
the non-determinism of the outside system has no direct impact on the security of the processor itself. As discussed in
Section 4.6, this may lead to different low-level behaviors and performance characteristics in real implementations.
Furthermore, even features with somewhat unpredictable behavior can be modeled deterministically as long as
their inputs are deterministic. For example, DVFS [28] modulates clock frequency during execution and can change
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the wall-clock time of code execution. However, if those modulation decisions are made via a digital circuit and their
inputs are deterministic, we can model DVFS as software-visible architectural state and guarantee that its use does not
violate our security conditions.
Property 2 requires a processor to be designed to remove timing channels through its microarchitecture. A recent
publication [7] shows that such a tagged processor with strong control for microarchitectural timing channels and
potentially reasonable overheads is feasible. Yu et al. [26] have also shown recently that it is feasible to build a
modern CPU with speculation, out-of-order execution and other microarchitectural optimizations while enforcing
probabilistic-noninterference [29]. These results provide evidence that it is possible to build efficient secure hardware,
with the appropriate ISA abstractions.
Property 3 suggests that processor microarchitecture needs to be designed in a way that allows the security label of
microarchitectural state to be determined. This property can be achieved by either statically labeling hardware modules
at design time or by adding hardware tags to track runtime labels. Recursively, these tags are also microarchitectural
state and their labels must also be computable. Therefore, real implementations will use both of these techniques
(static vs. dynamic labels) since Γ is only computable if it eventually reaches a fixed point.
Our ISA provides hardware designers with the flexibility to choose how to realize timing-sensitive noninterference.
For example, in order to remove cache timing channels, a processor designer may: statically partition a cache; dedicate
a cache to one security level and flush it when the security level is lowered; bypass the cache; or even introduce
scratchpad memory with a fixed latency, etc.
6.2 Enforcing Timing-Sensitive Noninterference in Hardware
For strong security assurance, we ideally want to formally enforce the properties needed for a secure hardware imple-
mentation. There exist several efforts to develop security-annotated Hardware Description Languages (HDL) that can
provide timing-sensitive noninterference guarantees, similar to the one we specify here [5, 30, 31]. Previous studies
show that these security-annotated HDLs can be used to express realistic security policies and implement complex
circuits that satisfy them [6, 7, 32, 33].
The primary challenge with proving Property 2 by using secure HDLs is that these languages do not have separate
notions of “architectural” and “microarchitectural” state; the entire circuit is represented as a single state machine.
Phrased another way, hardware and software are concerned with different definitions of observability; in the hardware
description, all state is considered observable, even though software can only directly observe architectural state. This
disconnect makes proving a hardware implementation correct challenging for a few specific reasons.
First, it is impossible to prove that an implementation that supports ISA-level downgrading provides microarchitec-
tural noninterference. Any implementation of our ISA must contain downgrades at the HDL level, which correspond
to those required to implement downgrading instructions. However, the noninterference guarantees provided by these
HDLs are completely obviated by including downgrades; they cannot ensure that the information being downgraded
is limited only to architectural state.
A second issue with proving hardware implementations secure is the difference in label equivalence models. We
assume that an attacker cannot read the value of a secret label, but can observe the fact that the label is secret. In the
hardware, any location which stores a label value must itself be labeled. Given the attacker model above, it is unclear
how to write down the label of this location. If we label it as public, then the HDL will allow us to define hardware
that leaks the values of secret labels to attackers. If we label it as secret, then the HDL will conservatively disallow
some safe label checking operations.
We believe that these problems may be solved by applying prior techniques for verifying CPU correctness (such
as Pipecheck and RTLCheck [34, 35]). Moreover, these approaches could be augmented with formal verification
tools specifically designed for IFC. For instance, Nickel [36] is a framework for proving noninterference that uses
application specific definitions of observational equivalence. Investigating how to utilize these approaches to prove
microarchitectural noninterference while supporting software-level downgrading and notions of observability is an
interesting open research question.
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pc1 “L pc2 ðñ pppcl1 ^ pcl2q R Lq _ ppc1 “ pc2q
t1 “L t2 ðñ pptl1 ^ tl2q R Lq _ pt1 “ t2q
L1 “L L2 ðñ pL1 « L2q ^ p@j P dompLq. Lpjq P L ùñ L1pjq “ L2pjqq
M1 “L M2 ðñ pL1 « L2q ^ p@j P dompMq. Lpjq P L ùñ M1pjq “M2pjqq
µ1 “L µ2 ðñ pΓpC1q « ΓpC2qq ^ p@n P dompµq. ΓpCqpnq P L ùñ µ1pnq “ µ2pnqq
CS 1 “L CS 2 ðñ CS 1 uL CS 2
C1 “L C2 ðñ ppc1 “L pc2q ^ pt1 “L t2q ^ pM1 “L M2q ^ pµ1 “L µ2q ^ pCS 1 “L CS 2q
Figure 9: Low Equivalence of Configuration Components, relative to “low” labels, L.
7 ISA Security Properties
This section describes some of the security properties of this ISA and their performance and usability tradeoffs.
Low Equivalence. We start by formalizing the low equivalence of configurations, relative to a set of low labels, L.
This models the ability of an observer who can only differentiate between low states; two low-equivalent configura-
tions appear identical to a “low observer”. First, we define an equivalence operator on label mappings to formalize our
notion that attackers cannot observe exact label values.
Definition 5 (Label Lookup Domain Equivalence). For an attacker inducing label sets P , S, U , and T
L1 « L2 ðñ @n P dompLq.
pL1pnq P P ðñ L2pnq P Pq ^
pL1pnq P T ðñ L2pnq P T q
We define the « relation on the labels of microarchitecture similarly.
Figure 9 shows the definition of low equivalence for all configuration components. We assume that L,M, µ and
Γ are total functions so that domain equality is implicit. The requirements of low equivalence explicitly require that
“label lookups” for both architectural and microarchitectural state return equivalent but not equal values for high labels.
Call stack low equivalence requires that all entries with low pcl are in the same position in the stack and are themselves
low-equivalent. By construction, all low entries must be at the head of the stack10 so it is sufficient to check that the
low prefixes of each call stack are equivalent.
Definition 6 (Call Stack Prefix Low Equivalence).
CS 1 uLCS 2 ðñ
p1q CS 1 “ H^ @ppci, tiq P CS 2, pci P H
or
p2q CS 2 “ H^ @ppci, tiq P CS 1, pci P H
or
p3q CS 1rheads “ ppc1, t1q “L ppc2, t2q “ CS 2rheads
^ CS 1rtails uL CS 2rtails
10This is enforced by preventing dwncalls while inside of an upcall.
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Security Guarantees. All of the theorems in this section have full proofs, which can be found in Appendix B. First,
we show that executing programs that do not contain downgrade or call-gate instructions preserve noninterference.
We use the term valid configurations to refer to configurations that were initialized with reasonable values. Specif-
ically, the configurations satisfy the ALL PC and ALL T requirements and the initial call stacks are empty.
Theorem 1 (Noninterference Modulo Downgrading and Call Gates).
For any two valid configurations, C1 and C2 and any low set of labels, L, where no instruction is a dwnlbl,
upcall, upret-done, dwncall or dwnret:
pCi ÝÑ˚ C 1iq ^ pC1 “L C2q ùñ C
1
1 “L C
1
2
where ÝÑ˚ is the reflexive, transitive closure of ÝÑ.
The proof is a straightforward structural induction on the operational semantics of the processor. By assuming
Property 2, essentially all of the work in this proof requires proving noninterference of the ÝÑA semantics.
We next extend Theorem 1 to prove noninterference even when using upcall instructions.
Theorem 2 (Noninterference Modulo Downgrading).
For any two valid configurations, C1 and C2, and any low set of labels, L, where no instruction is a dwnlbl,
dwncall or dwnret.
pCi ÝÑ˚ C 1iq ^ pC1 “L C2q ùñ C 11 “L C 12
In the scenario covered by Theorem 1, once the pcl was high, it could never be lowered again. That makes the
noninterference proof trivial but also limits functionality. To prove Theorem 2, we show that all operational steps taken
while an upcall is on the call stack can be modeled as a single operational step to low-equivalent configurations. We
can show this since the end configuration of the upcall is predetermined by low-equivalent state and high pcs are
noninterfering (i.e., programs executing with a high pc cannot modify any low visible state).
Note that while this theorem is termination-sensitive , it is not timing-sensitive. In the case where tl Ę pcl,
attackers may make observations about high state based on the timing of writes to low state. We present a corollary
that provides timing sensitivity.
Corollary 1 (Timing-Sensitive Noninterference Modulo Downgrading).
If ppcl P L ùñ tl P Lq for all intermediate configurations and upcall regions have fixed durations, then
Theorem 2 provides timing sensitivity.
This corollary ensures that any time that low writes are possible, the attacker will observe them occurring at the
same time. Furthermore, the duration of high call gates will be determined by low information.
As defined in Section 2, nonmalleability is essentially defined as maintaining both robust declassification and trans-
parent endorsement. Even with no syntactic restrictions (unlike the prior theorems) our ISA enforces nonmalleability.
Theorem 3 (Nonmalleable Information Flow). For attacker induced high label sets S and U and their respective
complements, P and T and valid configurations, @ts, uu P t1, 2u, Csu
ppCsu ÝÑ C 1suq ^ pC1u “P C2uq ^ pCs1 “T Cs2qq
ùñ
ppC 111 “P C 121 ùñ C 112 “P C 122q
^
pC 111 “T C 112 ùñ C 121 “T C 122qq
Assuming Theorem 2, we only need to reason about instructions which violate information flow: dwncall and
uplbl. The key restrictions which provide nonmalleability are those that prevent the pcl or tl from becoming compro-
mised and the restriction that compromised data is never downgraded.
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# PCLBL = TLBL = (TRUSTED, PUBLIC)
# L(key) = L(s0) = (TRUSTED, SECRET)
# L(in0) = (TRUSTED, PUBLIC)
upcall est, ST, ST, enc_end
----------------------------
# PCLBL = (T,S), TLBL = (T,S)
andi in0, in0, MASK
xor s0, key, in0
lw s0, 0(s0) # (a)
andi s0, in0, mask
lw s0, 0(s0) # (b)
declreg s0, PUBLIC
upret
----------------------------
enc_end:
Figure 10: Mitigated AES.
8 Program Examples
We now describe examples of how to use our ISA features in practical scenarios.
AES is a well known encryption algorithm which does not require the program to branch on any secrets [37].
Instead, AES uses a public lookup table indexed by computation involving both the secret key and public input.
This behavior of executing secret-dependent memory accesses makes it susceptible to a number of timing-channel
attacks [38–42], some of which are similar to the vulnerability in Figure 3.
Figure 10 is a toy version if this AES-style lookup table access in our ISA. Without mitigation techniques, the
execution of the second load (b) could be faster if it accesses the same cache line from (a). Similarly, another program
may also infer the value of the secret through cache contention.
One existing software-based mitigation technique for preventing this cache timing channel is to preload the entire
lookup table ahead of time [43]. Preloading allows a cache implementation to fill its entries with useful data based only
on public addresses. However, this approach is not guaranteed to be secure on normal hardware; if a cache were too
small to contain the entire table (or evicted entries for any other reason), it is possible that some lookups would trigger
misses, thereby leaking information with an unexpectedly slow duration for certain keys. Other efforts to eliminate
these problems with AES still rely on the assumption that certain instructions are constant-time [44].
Our ISA enables software to control microarchitectural timing channels in a principled manner. On hardware im-
plementing our ISA, the secret-dependent loads in Figure 10 cannot affect public microarchitectural state and therefore
cannot leak secret information through memory contention. Additionally, the strategy of preloading the cache can still
improve performance on some implementations. One potential CPU implementation might maintain private and pub-
lic cache partitions. During the preload phase, public and trusted code fills up the public cache partition with some or
all of the AES table. During the encryption phase, secret code can read those entries but cannot modify them, instead
making updates only to the private cache partition. This implementation would allow for a more secure and efficient
AES execution. Nevertheless, the duration of the entire execution could leak some information about the secret key;
this example also shows how software can use an upcall instruction to obscure that duration by providing an explicit
end time (via the est argument in the example’s upcall).
8.1 Password Checker
In this example, we show how to implement a nonmalleable password checker which can be called by untrusted users
with the dwncall instruction. The code for this checker is shown in Figure 11. This program starts in a public and
untrusted context, which would be typical for an unauthenticated user. The untrusted user generates their guess and
puts it into the register called guess. Then they use the dwncall instruction to call the check_pass function and gain
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# PCLBL = TLBL = (PUBLIC, UNTRUSTED)
# L(guess) = (PUBLIC, UNTRUSTED)
# L(pass) = (SECRET, TRUSTED)
dwncall check_pass
===============================
# PCLBL = TLBL = (PUBLIC, TRUSTED)
check_pass:
endoreg guess, TRUSTED
upcall est, ST, ST, end_check
-------------------------------
# PCLBL = TLBL = (SECRET, TRUSTED)
beq guess, pass, success
li res 0
upret
success:
li res 1
upret
-------------------------------
end_check:
declreg res, PUBLIC
dwnret
Figure 11: Password checking in the proposed ISA.
high integrity. This is analogous to executing a system call in a typical operating system, where the user program is
linked with trusted libraries and jumps into that code.
Once the check_pass function has started, it must endorse the user’s guess, since a trusted pc cannot branch on
low-integrity data. In order to compare the secret password value with the guess, the program executes an upcall
instruction to enter a timing-mitigated region. Inside that region, the program computes either a 1 or 0 based on
whether or not the guess was right or wrong, and then returns. Finally, at the end of the check_pass function, the
result is declassified to public and the call gate exits back to the untrusted context.
If an untrusted user were to execute the check_pass function like a normal function call, their attempts to endorse
their own guess and upcall into a secret and trusted state would both fail. This example illustrates the nonmalleability
guarantees and how trusted system code can be resident in the system but only accessible via call gates.
9 Related Work
Software Information Flow Control. Software-based IFC has been applied in many settings with the goal of elim-
inating timing channels [11, 17, 45–50]. Kashyap et al. [48] discuss various software strategies for enforcing timing-
sensitive noninterference. In particular, they focus on using lattice scheduling to ensure that the ordering of visible
events does not leak secret information. Parsec [46] is a language for concurrent programming which, given a race-
freedom analysis, ensures observational determinism, a noninterference condition for concurrent programs. Bedford et
al. [17] have also shown how a hybrid IFC system can provide progress-sensitive noninterference, a weaker condition
than timing sensitivity; it does not leak information based on which sets of outputs a program successfully produces.
Secure multi-execution, where a program is executed multiple times at varying security levels, has also been used to
prove timing-sensitive noninterference [50]. LIO [47] is a Haskell-based language extension for mitigating both exter-
nal and internal channels through the use of monadic computation and IFC. Of the aforementioned systems, only LIO
handles external timing channels. Like our ISA, LIO provides a dynamic semantics for enforcing noninterference but
lacks features such as downgrading and integrity tracking.11 Additionally, it is a high-level language which requires a
software runtime for its security, making it unsuitable as an ISA description.
11Follow-up work (e.g., [19, 51]) addresses some of these features.
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This paper describes a dynamic label12 model where all data is labeled, including data used to represent labels.
This is reminiscent of systems such as JFlow/Jif [52, 53] and the dynamic security labels formalism [27]. These
languages rely on static annotations and dynamic label-checking operations to guarantee noninterference while still
permitting labels to be used in types. Since our labels have a hardware representation, label-checking operations can be
implemented efficiently in hardware. Our platform appears well suited to accelerating such languages, allowing them
to execute outside of a software runtime. We considered explicitly modeling precise “labels of labels” as software-
accessible state, but it was unclear what further security this provided, and it significantly complicated the run-time
checks. Other dynamic IFC languages, such as LIO [47], treat the label of label values as visible to the current context
but do not allow for their precise manipulation. This choice mirrors our rule that the label of label arguments must
flow to pcl.
Hardware-level information flow control. IFC techniques have also been used to build timing-safe hardware.
While not focused on timing, Suh et al. [54] showed that processors could implement efficient information flow
tracking. Caisson and Sapper [6, 33] provided a nested state machine abstraction for circuit design and proved that
hardware built using those tools enforced timing-sensitive noninterference. More expressive HDLs that provide sim-
ilar security guarantees have also been developed using dependent types [30, 55]. The Hyperflow processor [7] is a
fully-featured implementation of a RISC-V CPU developed using these techniques.
Secure ISAs. While many of the above HW IFC systems presented CPUs and ISAs, they were focused on security
guarantees about the circuits. None of them have proved security results for programs executing on top of their
example abstractions. Ge et al. [12] have defined a set of properties they argue post-Spectre ISAs (called aISAs)
must enforce to provide efficient, timing-sensitive security. These properties primarily focus on prescribing how an
operating system can interact with the hardware to provide timing security. They refer to concrete mechanisms such
as hardware partitioning and time multiplexing rather than the security properties that these mechanisms should aim to
enforce. Our ISA provides more fundamental guarantees than those suggested in their work, but real implementations
of our ISA would likely exhibit many of the properties they list.
Yu et al. [26] have built an ISA extension for “oblivious computing” and have proved probabilistic noninterference
results. They have also built and measured the performance of a speculative, out-of-order processor using this ISA
and demonstrated its performance improvements over more conservative techniques. Their ISA treats security as
an optional component which software may opt-in to by labeling instruction operands as public or secret. This is
promising evidence of the practicality of efficient microarchitectures for secure ISAs.
The work of Zhang et al. [11] on language-based timing mitigation defines a software–hardware contract based on
“write labels” and “read labels” that almost directly parallel our pcl and tl. However, that contract requires well-typed
programs that correctly specify write and read labels; the hardware itself is not assumed to enforce any restrictions on
how these labels change over time. Furthermore, our ISA considers both confidentiality and integrity while enforcing
nonmalleable downgrading. We do not require a fully trusted entity to perform timing mitigation: any upcall caller
can implement their own mitigation algorithm in their own context.
OS-level information flow control. Asbestos [56] and HiStar [23] are two well known IFC operating systems. They
do not assure timing safety. However, HiStar’s notion of gates informed our call gate mechanism, but the restrictions
on gates and the security guarantees differ from ours. NickelOS [36] has been recently developed using intransitive
noninterference, which allows more flexible security policies than traditional IFC. However, NickelOS is not timing-
sensitive and focuses on information flow exposed through OS APIs.
10 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have proposed an ISA that defines a contract between software and hardware that defines how
information may or may not affect the timing of instructions. Importantly, it provides timing safety without requiring
12The word dynamic is unfortunately overloaded. Here, it refers to labels whose values are explicitly visible or comparable at run time. Dynamic
IFC systems are those that enforce security via run-time checks. Our ISA both has dynamic labels and is a dynamic IFC system.
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that instructions explicitly execute in worst-case time. As a byproduct, our proofs delineate conditions that hardware
should satisfy, thus providing guidance to hardware designers.
We foresee many avenues for further research in the domain of timing secure ISAs. Modeling more ISA features
such as exceptions, memory models, and other concurrency mechanisms can provide evidence toward the practicality
of this approach to ISA design. Furthermore, it will help expose more potential side channels that exist throughout the
complex environment of multicore processors.
Given this foundation, we can develop new instructions or instruction semantics that expose different timing char-
acteristics, such as fixed-latency scratchpad memory [57] or other “oblivious” computation [26]. Experimenting with
these new ideas in the context of a nonmalleable ISA can also ensure that the security guarantees hold end to end.
The largest open question is how to formally verify that hardware implementations satisfy the properties defined
in Section 6, allowing us to connect security guarantees of high-level languages and verified operating systems to the
actual behavior of the underlying hardware. We think there are many opportunities to improve existing secure HDLs
for finer grained downgrading (of both data and time), and to adapt hardware functional verification techniques to
prove IFC properties of processors.
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A Definitions
GR $ xCS ,M,L, pc, ty ÝÑA xCS ,M 1, L1, pc1, tly
 INUPCALL LpMppcvqq Ę pcl _ pcl Ę 

JJ ppclq
GR $ xCS ,M,L, pc, ty ÝÑA xCS ,M,L, perrorpc, pclq, tly
ALL PC ERROR
 INUPCALL Lprs1q \ Lprs2q Ę pcl
GR $ xCS ,M,L, pc, ty ÝÑA xCS ,M,L, perrorpc, pclq, tly
BRANCH ERROR
 INUPCALL l1 “ γpRs1q pLprs1q Ę pclq _ pl1 Ę 

JJ ppclqq
GR $ xCS ,M,L, pc, ty ÝÑA xCS ,M,L, perrorpc, pclq, tly
UPLBL ARG ERROR
 INUPCALL l1 “ γpRs1q pLprs1q Ę pclq _ pl Ę 

JJ ppclqq
GR $ xCS ,M,L, pc, ty ÝÑA xCS ,M,L, perrorpc, pclq, tly
RELBL ARG ERROR
 INUPCALL Lprs1q \ Lprs2q Ę pcl
GR $ xCS ,M,L, pc, ty ÝÑA xCS ,M,L, perrorpc, pclq, tly
RAISELBL ARG ERROR
 INUPCALL Lprs1q \ Lprs2q \ Lprs3q \ Lprdq Ę pcl
GR $ xCS ,M,L, pc, ty ÝÑA xCS ,M,L, perrorpc, pclq, tly
UPCALL ARG ERROR
pGRpRs1q “ Hq _
pH ‰ CS rheadsq _ pLprs1q Ę pclq _ ppc1l \ t1l Ć pclq
GR $ xCS ,M,L, pc, ty ÝÑA xCS ,M,L, perrorpc, pclq, tly
DWNCALL ARG ERROR
 INUPCALL
GR $ xCS ,M,L, pc, ty ÝÑA xCS ,M,L, ppcv ` 4, pclq, tly
OTHER ERROR
INUPCALL
GR $ xCS ,M,L, pc, ty ÝÑA xCS ,M,L, pc, tly UPRET ERROR
Figure 12: Operational semantics for error handling rules given a call-gate registry GR.
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We begin by restating some definitions from Section 2. Here, li, i and c represent elements of Lbl.
pi, cqÑ fi c
pi, cqÐ fi i
l1 Ď l2
4ô plÐ1 Ď lÐ2 q ^ plÑ2 Ď lÑ1 q
l1 \ l2 fi pplÑ2 \ lÑ2 q, plÐ1 [ lÐ2 qq
l1 [ l2 fi pplÑ2 [ lÑ2 q, plÐ1 \ lÐ2 qq



J
J pi, cq fi pc, iq
Call stack validity can be formalized as:
CS “ pppcl0, pcv0, tl0, tv0q...ppcln, pcvn, tln, tvnqq
ISVALIDpCS q fi @i P p0, n´ 1q.ppcli Ď pcli`1 or pcli`1 Ď pcliq
ISVALIDpCS , pclq fi ISVALIDpCS q and ppcl Ď pcl0 or pcl0 Ď pcl or CS “ Hq
ISVALID (CS ,pcl) can be read as “CS is valid for pcl”, meaning that the call stack itself has ordered entries and
the pcl is ordered with respect to the head of the call stack. This restriction maintains the idea that call gates cannot
be freely mixed with moving the pcl around via raiselbl; call gates need to reflect the actual sequence of control
transfer agreed upon when the gates are established via dwncall or upcall.
Definition 7 (Call Stack Validity).
A call stack, CS , is valid with respect to the current pcl if it represents an uninterrupted sequence of call gate calls
and returns.
A configuration is valid if it has a valid pcl, tl and CS :
Definition 8 (Configuration Validity).
A configuration, C, is valid iff: pcl Ď 

JJ ppclq, pcl Ď tl, tl Ď 

JJ ptlq, and CS is valid for pcl.
This validity condition captures the notion that the pcl and tl remain uncompromised, in addition to call stack
validity.
Notation. Two low-equivalent configurations C1 and C2 contain state such as pc or tl which may vary between them
or be the same. When the values must be equivalent in both configurations we omit subscripts. When they may differ,
we use subscripts to denote to which configuration they belong.
B Proofs
Based on our attacker definition, all secret and untrusted labels are compromised.
Lemma 1. For S and U sets induced by an attacker:
@l P Lbl. l P S X U ùñ l Ę 

JJ plq
Proof. Recall that attacker-induced sets are defined as upward-closed sets with a minimum confidentiality cA and a
maximum integrity iA. The label piA, cAq is itself compromised and by Definition 1, we have piA, cAq Ę pcA, iAq.
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The upward closure property implies @l P S X U .piA, cAq Ď l. We show that l Ď 

JJ plq ùñ piA, cAq Ď pcA, iAq
and by contrapositive, l must be compromised. We represent l explicitly as pli, lcq.
l Ď 

JJ plq ” pli, lcq Ď plc, liq
” pli Ď lcq ^ pli Ď lcq pBy definition of Ď q
ùñ iA Ď lc pBy piA, cAq Ď l ùñ piA Ď liqq
ùñ iA Ď cA pBy piA, cAq Ď l ùñ plc Ď cAqq
” piA Ď cAq ^ piA Ď cAq
” piA, cAq Ď pcA, iAq pBy definition of Ď q
Lemma 2 (No Compromised Call Stack Entries). No valid call stack will contain any entries whose pcl is compro-
mised.
Proof. Any instruction may only execute successfully if the pcl itself is valid. The pcl validity condition requires that
it is an uncompromised label. Therefore, any time an upcall or dwncall succeeds and places an entry onto the stack,
the label of that entry (the current pcl) must be valid and uncompromised.
Configuration validity is preserved under our instruction semantics.
Lemma 3 (Validity of Configurations). If C is a valid configuration and C ÝÑ˚ C 1, configuration C 1 is also valid.
Proof. We show that no instruction will step to an invalid configuration and by induction, this lemma holds. Instruc-
tions upcall, dwncall, and raiselbl check that the ISVALID (pcl,tl) condition holds for the new pcl and tl. If the
new labels would be invalid, then the current (and valid) labels are retained. Furthermore, when the upret-done or
dwnret instructions execute, by Lemma 2, the resulting pcl and tl will be uncompromised (and a similar argument
fulfills the remainder of the ISVALID (pcl,tl) condition).
Therefore, the only validity condition we must check is call stack validity. The only instructions which change CS
are upcall/upret-done and dwncall/dwnret. Instructions upcall and dwncall explicitly require that the current
pcl is ordered with respect to the new pc (pc
1
l). For upcall, pcl Ď pc1l and for dwncall pc1l Ď pcl. Since the new
“head” of the call stack will have an entry label of pcl, validity is preserved. Inductively, any dwnret or upret-done
instruction will also preserve call stack validity since the pcl of CS ’s first entry must either be ordered with respect to
CS ’s second entry or CS has only one entry.
The raiselbl instruction is prohibited from changing pcl or tl whenever CS is nonempty; therefore the only other
instruction which changes the pcl cannot violate the ordering relationship between CS [head] and pcl.
In particular, the dwncall and upcall restrictions require that pcl’ and pcl are ordered, and then push pcl onto the
call stack. The raiselbl restriction ensures that pcl can only be raised when already in an upcall or when the call
stack is empty. In the latter case, validity is trivially preserved. In the former, the upcall restrictions ensure that the
label of CS rheads Ď pcl, which means raising pcl will maintain that ordering.
Lemma 4 (Call Stack Upcall History). For any two valid configurations C1 and C2, If C1 “L C2 and pcl P L, then
either both configurations are in an upcall region, or neither is.
Proof. If either one of the call stacks is empty, then, by Definition 6, the other must also be empty or all of its entries
have a high pc label (which we’ll denote pccs). If both are empty, then neither is in an upcall region.
If only one is empty, a dwncall from high to low must have generated the head entry of that stack. An upcall
could not have executed successfully since upcall requires that the pc label of the executing context flows to the new
pc label. Since pcl is low and pccs is high, pccs Ę pcl (by upward closure of H). Furthermore, since a dwncall can
only be made when the call stack is empty, there could have been no prior upcall executed without a corresponding
return. In this case, one configuration is inside a dwncall region and the other is inside no call-gate region.
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If both call stacks are nonempty, let CS irheads “ pppcvi, pcliq, ptvi, tliqq. If pcli PH then, by the same argument
as before, both configurations must be inside a dwncall region but not inside an upcall region. If pcli P L, then pcl1
= pcl2. This means that the most recent call gate instruction was either an upcall or a dwncall, but it must be the
same for both configurations. If it was a dwncall, then CS irtails “ H and neither configuration is in an upcall
region.
Lemma 5 (Low Equivalence of Error Rules in Low Contexts). For any set of low labels, L, and any two valid
configurations C1, C2 and C1 ÝÑ C 11 by applying an ERROR rule, and insn ı DWNLBL,DWNCALL,DWNRET
pC1 “L C2q ^ ppcl P Lq ùñ pC 11 “L C 12q
Proof. First, we show that this lemma holds for all of the error rules in Figure 12. For any check in the form of
Lpvarq Ď pcl13, we can guarantee that the result of that check is the same for low-equivalent configurations when pcl
P L.
If L1pvarq P L, then by the low equivalence of configurations, L2pvarq “ L1pvarq. The evaluation of Lpvarq Ď
pcl therefore results in the same outcome in both configurations. If L1pvarq P H, then by the low equivalence of
configurations, L2pvarq P H. In both cases, the check will fail since H is upward closed and pcl P L. By Lemma
4, either both configurations are in an upcall region, or neither is. Therefore the INUPCALL check has the same result
for C1 and C2. All of the rules in Figure 12 contain only checks of the form Lpvarq Ď pcl14 and INUPCALL checks.
Since the outcome of the label checking must be the same in both configurations, updating the pcv to errorpc does not
violate low equivalence in the resulting configurations.
We now consider the label checks specific to various instructions.
Branch/Jump:
These label checks only contains checks of the form Lpvarq Ď pcl. By our earlier argument, the BRANCH ERROR
rule from Figure 12 always results in low-equivalent configurations.
Compute/Load/Store:
The checks for these instructions ensure that all of the labels of the operands flow to the label of the destination.
Wlog. we can analyze a check of the form Lpv1q Ď Lpv2q.
Let us consider the four possible cases that C1 can evaluate:
Case 1) Lpv1q, Lpv2q P L
In this case, by the low equivalence of configurations both L1pv1q = L2pv1q and L1pv2q = L2pv2q and so the
success or failure of the label check is the same for both configurations.
Case 2) Lpv1q P L, Lpv2q P H
In this case, L1pv1q = L2pv1q and Lpv2q is high in both configurations. It is possible that this label check fails
in C1 but succeeds in C2 or vice versa.
Case 3) Lpv1q P H, Lpv2q P L
In this case the check will fail in both configurations, since H is upward closed and Lpv1q is high in both
configurations.
Case 4) Lpv1q P H, Lpv2q P H
Like case 2, this label check could fail in only one of the configurations, since not all high values flow to one
another.
In cases 1 and 3, both configurations will fail (this lemma considers only the cases where C1 fails label checking)
and therefore neither will update memory or label state, which implies that low equivalence will be preserved. In cases
2 and 4, the Lpv2q is a high label. This means that even if the operation succeeds in one configuration and not the other,
the changes to memory happen only on elements with high labels. Therefore, memory low equivalence is preserved.
13Or of the form Lpvarq Ę pcl
14Or Lpvarq Ď 

JJ ppclq which does not change our reasoning.
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Uplabel:
UPLBLppcl, l, l1q fi ppcl Ď l Ď l1q ^ pl1 Ď 

JJ ppclqq
As argued above, if the UPLBL ARG ERROR rule is matched, low equivalence is preserved since both configurations
will fail this check and step to the error program counter. Let us now consider the case where an UPLBL instruction
fails label checking but the UPLBL ARG ERROR rule does not apply. In this case, L1prs1q Ď pcl and is therefore low.
This implies that Rs1 is equal in both configurations and therefore l11 “ l12. The l1 Ď 

JJ ppclq component of the label
check will therefore result in the same value for both configurations. Lastly, we consider the requirement: pcl Ď l Ď l1.
Again there are 4 cases to analyze:
Case 1) l, l1 P L
In this case, l1 “ l2 by low equivalence, so the label-checking result will be the same in both configurations.
Case 2) l1 P L, l P H
In this case, both l1 and l2 are in H by low equivalence and by upward closure of H, l Ď l1 will fail in both
configurations.
Case 3) l P L, l1 P H
By low equivalence, we have l1 “ l2 and both configurations compute the same label-check result.
Case 4) l, l1 P H
In this case, l1 and l2 are both in the high domain of L. Even if this label check succeeds in one configuration,
it will only change the value of a high label to another high label. This does not affect low equivalence so
L11 “L L12.
RaiseLbl:
If the RAISELBL ARG ERROR rule is not matched then the pcl, pc
1
l and t
1
l must be the same in both configurations.
The only two cases to consider are based on the current value of tl. If tl P L, then both configurations will fail the
label check and low equivalence is preserved. If tl PH, then even if only one configuration succeeds t1l1 “L t1l2 since
both have high labels.
Upcall:
If the UPCALL ARG ERROR rule is not matched, thenRd, endpc, pc1l and t1l will be the same in both configurations.
Since both configurations are valid we know that pcl Ď tl for both configurations. By the earlier argument, both
configurations will resolve the pcl Ď pc1l Ď t1l check the same way. If true then that implies the restriction tl Ď t1l
is true for both configurations as well. Therefore, if either configuration passes the label checking process, then both
configurations must pass it. By contrapositive, if either configuration fails then both will fail label checking.
Upret:
By Lemma 4, both configurations will either be in an upcall region or not, meaning that this instruction either
causes an error or does not in both configurations. In the case where an error occurs, no state is updated, and therefore
the resulting configurations are low-equivalent.
Lemma 6 (High PC Call Stack Noninterference). For any two valid configurations C1 and C2, where neither config-
uration executes an UPRET-DONE step.
pcl P H, C1 “L C2, Ci ÝÑ C 1i ùñ CS 11 “L CS 12
Proof. By the definition of call stack equivalence, both call stacks begin with equivalent prefixes of entries with low
pcl, or neither contains any entries with a low pcl.
In the former case, the heads of these stacks must contain low-equivalent entries, where the pc label of these
entries (pclentry) is P L. In both configurations, pcl P H and therefore this entry must have been produced by an
upcall instruction. While in an upcall region, the only stack-modifying instruction that can successfully return is
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UPRET-DONE. Since we are excluding that rule in this lemma, the resulting call stacks in this case must always be
low-equivalent, because they cannot be modified.
In the latter case, call stacks produced by these configurations are low-equivalent. Popping off entries from the
stack cannot introduce entries with low pcl and pushing on entries uses the current pcl, which is high. Therefore any
call-stack modifying instruction will result in low-equivalent call stacks.
This also leads to a useful corollary: if two configurations have a high pcl and neither is inside of a upcall with a
low entry label, their call stacks are always noninterfering. As noted in Lemma 6, if the entries on the call stack all
have high pcl, then no operation will place a low-labeled entry on the stack. Therefore call-stack low equivalence is
preserved.
Corollary 2. For any two valid configurationsC1 andC2, whereCS irheads “ H orCS irheads “ pppcvi, pcliq, ptvi, tliqq
and pcli P H.
pcl P H, C1 “L C2, Ci ÝÑ C 1i ùñ CS 11 “L CS 12
Now we show that configurations with high pcl cannot make any low-visible changes to state without the use of
downgrading instructions or call gates. We then use this result to prove the more general noninterference of high pcs
lemma.
Lemma 7 (Noninterference of High PCs Modulo Call Gates). For any two valid configurations, C1 and C2, if insn ı
DWNCALL,DWNRET,UPCALL,UPRET-DONE
ppcl P Hq ^ pCi ÝÑ C 1iq ^ pC1 “L C2q
ùñ xCS 11,M 11, L11, pc11, t1l1y “L xCS 12,M 12, L12, pc12, t1l2y
Proof. First, we note that C1 and C2 may or may not be executing the same instruction; therefore, this proof must rely
on reasoning about the visible effects of any given single configuration.
Label Mappings:
We show that Li “L L1i to prove noninterference of label mappings since pL1 “L L2q^pLi “L L1iq ùñ L11 “L
L12. For each instruction we must show that the low and high domains of L do not change, and that low labels are not
modified at all. To show the former, we need to show that any label being changed remains in the same quadrant of
the lattice after modification. In general, if any label-modifying instruction fails, low equivalence is preserved since L
cannot change.
First, we consider the uplbl instruction, which sets some location’s label from l to l1.
Recall that the primary restriction for this instruction is:
UPLBLppcl, l, l1q fi ppcl Ď l Ď l1q ^ pl1 Ď 

JJ ppclqq
There are four cases to consider here: l P L; H “ S ^ l P S X T ; H “ U ^ l P P X U ; l P S X U .
Case 1) l P L
UPLBL requires pcl Ď l, so this case cannot succeed.
Case 2) H “ S ^ l P S X T
UPLBL requires l Ď l1 ^ l1 Ď 

JJ ppclq. We show by contradiction that if l1 P S X U and pcl P S, this instruction
cannot succeed. (And consequently, l1 P S X T when the instruction does succeed.)
Assume: l1 Ď 

JJ ppclq
” pl1Ð Ď pcÑl q ^ ppcÐl Ď l1Ñq pBy definitionq
ùñ pAÐ Ď pcÑl q pl1 P U ùñ AÐ Ď l1Ðq
ùñ pAÐ Ď AÑq ppcl P S ùñ pcÑl Ď AÑq
” iA Ď cA ” piA, cAq Ď 

JJ ppiA, cAqq
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This assumption contradicts our definition of attacker, so we have l1 Ę 

JJ ppclq. In conclusion, if l1 P S X U , the
instruction will not succeed.
In the case where the instruction succeeds, l1 P S X T .
Case 3) H “ U ^ l P P X U
This follows the same logic as in case 2: we show by contradiction that, if l1 P S X U , and pcl P U , then
l1 Ę 

JJ ppclq. When the instruction succeeds, l1 P P X U .
Case 4) l P S X U
Since l Ď l1, l1 P S X U .
Next we consider the dwnlbl instruction, which modifies the label of some location (l “ Lprdqq to some new
value (l1 “ γpRs1q). The primary restriction on executing this instruction is:
RELBLppcl, l, l1q fi ppcl Ď l [ l1q ^ pl Ď 

JJ plqq ^ pl1 Ď 

JJ ppclqq
Again, there are 4 cases to consider: l P L;H “ S, l P S X T ; H “ U , l P P X U ; l P S X U .
Case 1) l P L
RELBL requires pcl Ď l [ l1, so this case cannot succeed.
Case 2) H “ S, l P S X T
If the instruction succeeds, l1 R P since RELBL requires pcl Ď l [ l1. Let us assume l1 P S X U . In that case,
by the same reasoning as for uplbl, l1 Ę 

JJ ppclq. Therefore, if the label check passes in this case, l1 P S X T .
Case 3) H “ U , l P P X U
This case has exactly the same reasoning as case 2. If label checks succeed, then l1 P P X U .
Case 4) l P S X U
By Lemma 1, l Ę 

JJ plq, and therefore this case will fail the label check and not modify L.
Memories:
For all of the instructions which write to M , the pcl must flow to the label of the modified memory location. Since
no label modification instructions change the low domains of memory this implies that neither configuration can make
low visible modifications to memory: ppcl P Hq ^ pM1 “L M2q ^ pLi « L1iq ùñ M 11 “L M 12
Program Counters and PC/Time Labels:
First we consider the raiselbl instruction. It requires pcl Ď pc1l and tl Ď t1l, ensuring that pc1l and t1l are also high
labels, and therefore pc1v will be low-equivalent across the configurations.
If the executing instruction fails for any reason (thus triggering the ERROR rule), the pcl and tl remain high and no
other state is modified.
Theorem 1 (Noninterference Modulo Downgrading and Call Gates). For any two valid configurations, C1 and C2
and any low set of labels, L, if insn ı DWNLBL,DWNRET,UPCALL,UPRET-DONE,DWNCALL
Ci ÝÑ˚ Ci˚ ^ C1 “L C2 ùñ C1˚ “L C2˚
Proof. We prove this by structural induction over the ÝÑ operator: Ci ÝÑ C 1i. By Property 2, we know that µ and t
are noninterfering, such that µ11 “L µ12 and t1v1 “L t1v2. When the STALL rule is applied, no architectural state changes
and therefore C 11 “L C 12.
Therefore, we now only need to consider the ÝÑA function and the configuration it produces.
As a reminder:
GR $ xCS ,M,L, pc, ty ÝÑA xCS 1,M 1, L1, pc1, t1ly
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We show that
xCS 11,M 11, L11, pc11, t1l1y “L xCS 12,M 12, L12, pc12, t1l2y
holds for all possible applications of ÝÑA.
By Lemma 7, when pcl P H
xCS 11,M 11, L11, pc11, t1l1y “L xCS 12,M 12, L12, pc12, t1l2y.
Now we consider the case when pcl P L. By Lemma 5, we know that in situations where one or more of the
configurations fails label checking, low equivalence of configurations is preserved. We now consider only scenarios
where both configurations pass label checking.
Both configurations must be executing the same instruction (by the ALL PC rule which ensures that the instruction
itself is located in low-labeled memory).
Label Mappings:
Unlike in Lemma 7 we can allow labels to change their current quadrant, as long as the change results in low-
equivalent label maps. Again, UPLBL is the only instruction which modifies L. This instruction updates label l ”
Lprdq to l1 ” γpRs1q and requires l Ď l1.
rd and rs1 must both have the same respective value across configurations since they are part of the instruction.
l11 “ l12 since LpRs1q Ď pcl ùñ Rs1 has the same value in both configurations.
The three possible cases are: l, l1 P L; l P L and l1 P H; and l, l1 P H. Since there is only 1 case where l P H,
l11 “ l12 and L1 “L L2, both configurations must execute the same case.
Case 1) l, l1 P L
Since the only mapping updated in L1 is rd ÞÑ l1 and it is changed equivalently in L1 and L2, L11 “L L12.
Case 2) l P L, l1 P H
In this case, the low and high domains of L1 and L2 change, but they will still both change in the same way
(Lprdq goes from L to H in both configurations).
Case 3) l, l1 P High
The domains of L1 and L2 do not change and none of the labels in the low domains change, so this does not
change the low equivalence of L1 and L2.
Memories:
All of the compute instructions require that the labels of the operands flow to the labels of the destination. Further-
more, the location in memory to be updated is part of the instruction and therefore is equivalent in both configurations.
Therefore, if the label of the destination is low, the operands will have low labels and be equivalent. This ensures that
changes to low memory happen the same way in each configuration. Additionally, the proof that L11 “L L12 implies
that the new low domains of memory will be equivalent as well (L11 « L12).
Program Counters and PC/Time Labels:
All branch/jump instructions require that their operands flow to pcl. Therefore, with a low pcl all of the operands
will have low labels and be equivalent in successful configurations: pc1v1 “ pc1v2.
The raiselbl instruction can raise the pcl and tl. This is analogous to the UPLBL rule for memory locations and
for similar reasons ensures that pc11 “L pc12 and t1l1 “L t1l2.
Corollary 3 (Timing-Sensitive Noninterference Modulo Downgrading and Call Gates). For any two valid configura-
tions, C1 and C2 and any low set of labels, L, if insn ı DWNLBL,UPCALL,UPRET,DWNCALL,DWNRET and, for all
configuration steps pcl P L ùñ tl P L,
Ci ÝÑ˚ Ci˚ ^ C1 “L C2 ùñ C1˚ “L C2˚
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Proof. This follows directly from the previous theorem and Property 2. If tl P L, then low equivalence of t ensures
that their values will be equal after each transition (tv1 “ tv2 and t1v1´ tv1 “ t1v2´ tv2 implies t1v1 “ t1v2). Essentially,
the two configurations must execute in lock step. In this scenario the only instruction which can raise tl is RAISELBL,
so as long as tl P L and no RAISELBL instruction raises the tl above pcl, timing sensitivity is preserved.
Executing a complete upcall region from a low context will preserve low equivalence. Since the end state of the
upcall is determined a priori by low-equivalent configurations, it ensures that both configurations will reach a state
where they are again low-equivalent and have exactly the same call stack state as they did initially.
Lemma 8 (High Upcall Noninterference). For any two valid configurations, C1 and C2, if pcl P L, C1 “L C2,
insn ” upcall, Ci ÝÑ C 1i and pc1l P H, then:
pCi ÝÑ˚ C2i ” xCS i,M2i , L2i , µ2i , pendpc, pcliq, pt2vi, tliqyq ^ pC21 “L C22 q
Proof. Ci ÝÑ C 1i and C1 “L C2.
By Lemma 5 either both configurations execute the UPCALL or neither does.
If they execute the UPCALL, the labels of rs1, rs2, rs3 and rd flow to pcl, which implies that pc
1
l, t
1
l, endpc and Rd
have equal respective values in both configurations. Additionally, both configurations will add a new call stack entry
with the following form: ppendpc, pclq, pendti, tliqq. These call stack entries are low-equivalent: pcl and endpc are
the same in both traces. If tl P H, then endt1 ‰ endt2 but their values need not be equal for low equivalence. If tl P
L, then tv1 “ tv2 and by low equivalence of Rd, endt1 “ endt2.
Pushing low-equivalent entries onto low-equivalent call stacks preserves low equivalence: CS 11 “L CS 12.
Additionally, since pc1l and t1l are low-equivalent across configurations, pc11 “L pc12 Therefore, C 11 “L C 12.
Once the upcall is executing, no dwncall or upcall instructions can execute. Therefore, by Lemma 7, we can
conclude that these configurations will only step to other low-equivalent configurations. Additionally, their call stacks
will not be modified until they return from the upcall region via the UPRET-DONE rule.
At some point (when tvi “ endti) each configuration executes the UPRET-DONE rule. This may not happen after
the same number of transition steps, and if tli P H, it may not even happen at the same wall-clock time for each
configuration.
When each configuration executes the UPRET-DONE rule, it pops the head of its call stack. We know that the
original call stacks were low-equivalent, so popping off the heads results in the original call stacks.
Additionally, they will restore the original pcl and tl values, which were low-equivalent in the original configura-
tion and both will set pcv = endpc. Therefore, the upcall region executes without making any changes to state that
violate low equivalence and the call stacks, pc and tl restored by the UPRET-DONE are also low-equivalent.
Note that, if tl P L, then endt is also low-equivalent and these two configurations must execute the UPRET-DONE
instruction at the same time. They may have executed a different number of instructions while in the call-gate region,
but the wall-clock time will be identical.
Theorem 2 (Noninterference Modulo Downgrading and Dwncalls). For any two valid configurations, C1 and C2,
and any low set of labels, L, where no instruction is a dwnlbl, dwncall or dwnret.
pCi ÝÑ˚ C 1iq ^ pC1 “L C2q ùñ C 11 “L C 12
Proof. This follows naturally from Theorem 1 and Lemma 8.
As long as the current instruction is not an upcall or upret-done, both configurations will step (ÝÑ) to low-
equivalent configurations, by Theorem 1.
If the current instruction is an upcall or the UPRET-DONE rule applies, then we must consider both the high and
low pcl cases.
pcl P L. By Lemma 5, upcall will fail or succeed in both configurations. Let us first consider what happens when
upcall executes successfully.
If pc1l P H then by Lemma 8, both configurations will only step to low-equivalent states while in the upcall and
will exit the upcall in low-equivalent states.
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If pc1l P L, then by Theorem 1 as long as no more upcall instructions execute, low equivalence is preserved. It is
important to note that, by the UPCALL rule, pcl \ tl Ď pc1l. In this case, it implies that tl P L and therefore the end
time of the call gate will be exactly the same time in both configurations (same start and end, not just duration). If
another UPCALL is executed while the upcall is running, it will fail in both configurations since they cannot be nested.
When the UPRET-DONE rule is applied, both configurations will step to low-equivalent configurations with equal
pcv and tv . Since the implementation is deterministic (Property 1), the initial configurations are low-equivalent and
the tl in the call gate is exactly the same between both configurations, we are guaranteed that the same number of
ÝÑA steps execute in both configurations before the call gate expires at time endt. Without this guarantee, it would
be possible for one upcall to exit having completed fewer instructions than the other and in that case their end states
would not necessarily be low-equivalent.
pcl P H. Either both configurations are inside a low-pc-originating upcall or neither is (by the same argument as
in Lemma 6, regarding call stack low-equivalent prefixes). If they are executing inside an upcall region, then this
reduces to a case in Lemma 8, which ensures they will eventually return outside of the upcall and will maintain low
equivalence.
If neither one is in a low-pc-originating upcall, then their call stacks may differ: one of them may be in a upcall
while the other configuration is not. However, we can apply both the corollary to Lemma 6 and Lemma 7 here to show
that these configurations will step to low-equivalent configurations. The corollary states exactly the condition we have:
if neither configuration is in a low-pc-originating upcall, and pcl PH, then the resulting call stacks are low-equivalent.
Lemma 7 ensures that all other state is noninterfering for high pcs. Therefore, high pcs are always noninterfering as
long as the configuration is valid.
Corollary 4 (Timing-Sensitive-Noninterference Modulo Downgrading and Dwncalls). For any two valid configura-
tions, C1 and C2, and any low set of labels, L, where no instruction is a dwnlbl, dwncall or dwnret and for all pc,
pcl P L ùñ tl P L.
pCi ÝÑ˚ C 1iq ^ pC1 “L C2q ùñ C 11 “L C 12
Proof. This is a direct corollary to Theorem 2 and is strictly stronger than Corollary 3 since it also allows the use of
low-deterministic UPCALL instructions (i.e. no timing mitigation).
Theorem 3 (Nonmalleable Information Flow). For attacker induced high label sets S and U and their respective
complements, P and T , and valid configurations, @ts, uu P t1, 2u, Csu
Csu ÝÑ C 1su ^ @u P t1, 2u. C1u “P C2u ^ @s P t1, 2u. Cs1 “T Cs2
ùñ
C 111 “P C 121 ùñ C 112 “P C 122 ^ C 111 “T C 112 ùñ C 121 “T C 122
Proof. For all of the instructions other than dwncall/dwnret and dwnlbl, Theorem 2 implies the nonmalleability
condition. Therefore, we only need to consider how the new instructions affect processor state.
Additionally, since the conditions are exactly dual we only prove the first of the two requirements:
C 111 “P C 121 ùñ C 112 “P C 122
First we consider the dwnlbl instruction. We have already proven that this instruction results in low-equivalent
configurations for high pcs in Lemma 7. Therefore, if pcl P S Y U , dwnlbl results in low equivalent configurations
for both L = P and L = T .
Therefore, we now consider the case where pcl P P X T . The dwnlbl instruction modifies the label of rd
(l “ Lprdq) to a new label value (l1 “ γpRs1q). In the case where RELBL ARG ERROR rule matches, all configurations
will step to the error pc and not modify any other state (by the same argument as for UPLBL ARG ERROR in Lemma
5). If that error rule does not match, l1 is equivalent in all four configurations since Lprs1q flows to pcl and pcl P PXT .
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Since l1 is equivalent in all configurations, then the label checks: pcl Ď l1 and l1 Ď 

JJ ppclq will both succeed or fail
in all four configurations. If they fail, then all four new configurations still maintain low equivalence since Lsu is not
modified in any of them.
Next let us consider the label check l Ď 

JJ plq.
L1 “L L2 ùñ L1 « L2 for any set of low labels, L. Additionally, domain equivalence («) is transitive.
Therefore, all four starting configurations agree on the domain of all locations (L11 « L21 « L12 « L22). We will
now consider the four possible quadrants in which l can reside:
Case 1) l P P X T
In this case, l is exactly the same in all four configurations. Therefore, label checking will succeed or fail in all
four configurations and result in the same modifications to L (l1 and rd are also equal in all four configurations).
The low equivalence relations between configurations will be maintained.
Case 2) l P P X U
For any two public equivalent (“P ) configurations then this will also result in the same label checking result
and the same modifications to L. Any configurations which were public equivalent before this instruction are
still public equivalent.
C1u “P C2u ùñ C 11u “P C 12u
Case 3) l P S X T
For any two trusted equivalent (“T ) configurations then this will result in the same label checking result and
same modifications to L. Any configurations which were trusted equivalent before this instruction are still
trusted equivalent.
Cs1 “T Cs2 ùñ C 1s1 “T C 1s2
In this case, we know that L1s1 “T L1s2 and we assume in the premise that L111 “P L121. Therefore, L112 « L111 «
L121 « L122.
Next, we will consider the four possible quadrants for l1:
Case 1) l1 P P X T
In this case, l1 has the same value in each resulting configuration by transitivity of low-equivalent labels
(L112 “PXT L122). Regardless of whether or not configurations C12 and C22 both successfully executed
the dwnlbl instruction, they resulted in updating the same location to the same label value. Therefore, C 112
and C 122 are public equivalent.
Case 2) l1 P P X U
If this instruction succeeds in C12 it will modify both the T domain and the P domain (i.e. a label is
going from high to low in confidentiality and low to high in integrity). However, if it fails then it will not
modify either set of domains. Since L112 « L122 this success or failure must be the same in both of these
configurations (failure in one but not the other would imply L112 ff L122). Therefore it must either succeed
or fail in both of these configurations. If it fails, L112 and L122 are trivially low-equivalent. If it succeeds,
L112 and L122 are modified in the same way (since l1 has the same value across all four configurations) and
are still public equivalent.
Case 3) l1 P S X T
In this case, whether or not each configuration successfully executed the dwnlbl instruction has no bearing
on the public equivalence of L112 and L122. Since l1 is a secret label, its exact value may differ in these two
label mappings. Therefore, C 112 and C 122 remain public equivalent.
Case 4) l1 P S X U
By the same logic as in case 3, C 112 and C 122 remain public equivalent in this case as well.
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Case 4) l1 P S X U
By Lemma 1, if l P SXU , then l is compromised and the label check does not pass. Therefore, L is not updated
in any configuration and the resulting configurations remain low-equivalent.
Dwncalls:
Now we show that the dwncall and dwnret instructions maintain nonmalleability.
Based on the pcl of the starting configurations, there are 3 cases to prove, based on its quadrant (since pcl is valid
it cannot be in S X U , by Lemma 1).
Case 1) pcl P P X T
First, if the Lprs1q Ď pcl check fails then this will fail in all configurations and low equivalence is preserved.
Similarly, if the check that this call is going down in the lattice (pc1l \ t1l Ă pcl) fails, this will fail in all four
configurations.
Otherwise, pc1 and t1 will be the same in all four configurations, since they reference the same entry in the gate
registry.
If the dwncall executes successfully in C12 because CS 12 is empty, then CS 11 must either also be empty
or contain only public entries. By Lemma 2, it cannot contain any secret-untrusted entries and by trusted
equivalence with CS 12, it cannot contain any secret-trusted entries. By the premise (C 111 “P C 121) CS 21 must
be empty if CS 11 is empty and must otherwise contain public entries. By trusted equivalence, CS 22 must also
be either empty or contain only public entries. Since CS 12 “P CS 22, the latter must also be empty.
This argument is symmetric (we could have started reasoning with CS 22 and concluded that CS 12 must be
empty), the dwncall succeeds in C12 if and only if it succeeds in C22.
In the case where the instruction succeeds, both of the configurations will push on public equivalent call stack
entries and will jump to the same new pcl and pcv based on the gate registry entry.
In any case where the instruction fails in both configurations, no state changes other than the pcv and they will
therefore remain low-equivalent.
Case 2) pcl P P X U
If the Lprs1q Ď pcl check fails in C12 then it will also fail in C22. Similarly, if the check that this call is going
down in the lattice (pc1l \ t1l Ă pcl) fails in C12 it will also fail in C22.
Otherwise, pc1 and t1 will be the same in both configurations, since they reference the same entry in the gate
registry.
The reasoning from Case 1 about call stack equivalence holds in this case as well since it does not depend at
all on the current pcl of the configurations. Therefore, C12 and C22 will either both fail or both succeed on this
dwncall instruction. In the event the instruction succeeds, since their pcl are public equivalent, the call stack
entries that are pushed will be public equivalent as well, resulting in public equivalent configurations.
Case 3) pcl P S X T
In this case, if eitherC12 orC22 successfully executes a dwncall, and the resulting pc labels (pc1l) are both secret,
then the resulting configurations are public equivalent. By Lemma 6 (with L = P and H = S), the resulting call
stacks are public equivalent. Similarly, the pc and tl are public equivalent, since they remain secret.
Alternatively, either configuration may execute a dwncall such that pc1l P P X T . It is impossible for pc1l to be
untrusted, since dwncall requires that pc1l Ď pcl.
In this case, C11 must also be empty. Since CS 11 is valid, the label of its first entry must be ordered with respect
to pcl. Since no label in S X T flows to any label in P X U and no label in P X U flows to any label in S X T ,
that first entry must not be public and untrusted. However, by trusted equivalence with CS 12, it cannot contain
any secret entries either, and must therefore be empty.
By combining this with the call stack equivalence reasoning used in cases 1 and 2, this means that either all four
call stack configurations are empty, or they all contain public, trusted entries.
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Therefore, if C12 executes a dwncall successfully, then so must C11, since all other arguments to the instruction
flow to the pcl and are equal between the two configurations, and as reasoned above, both must have empty call
stacks.
Since the call gate entries will be the same across C12 and C11 they will both end up with the same pcv and
pcl in their new configurations. Similarly, they will push trusted equivalent call stack entries (whose labels are
secret and trusted) and C 112 “T C 111.
Furthermore, pc1l P P X T , which implies that C 121 will have the same pc1l and pc1v as configuration C 112, and
will also have a secret, trusted call stack entry. Since C21 must have successfully executed the same dwnlbl
instruction to end up in this state, by trusted equivalence C22 also must execute the same dwnlbl instruction
and will also end up with the same new pc1l and pc1v as the other configurations. Lastly, since the new call stack
entries are all secret and trusted, CS 112 “P CS 122 because neither contains any public entries.
Dwnret:
This is essentially analogous to dwncall instruction, except we are restoring saved pcv and pcl from the stored call
stack entries. Since the reasoning is so similar we will omit a full proof and include only a sketch.
Case 1) pcl P P
In this case both C12 and C22 will either execute the dwnret or not, since the INUPCALL check must have
the same result in both cases; if either configuration executes a dwnret successfully, then all four configurations
must successfully execute a similar dwnret.
In the case where the call stack entry is public, then both configurations must have the same call stack entry
and will end up in public equivalent configurations. If the call stack entry is secret and trusted, then by similar
transitive arguments for dwncall, all four configurations will execute a dwnret to secret, trusted pcs and will all
have empty call stacks.
Case 2) pcl P S X T
If C12 executes a dwnret successfully, the resulting pc1l must also be secret and trusted. Similarly, its new call
stack is empty and therefore still public equivalent to the call stack of C22 (which must have only contained
secret entries, or no entries at all). In this case, C 112 “P C 122 since it must also have a secret pc (the only
instruction for lowering the pcl is dwncall and by the earlier portion of this proof, it could not have executed a
successful dwncall).
Similarly, if C12 executes a dwnret which does not pass label checking, the result will remain public equivalent
with C 122.
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